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Abstract: We develop multi-conclusion nested sequent calculi for the fifteen logics of the
intuitionistic modal cube between IK and IS5. The proof of cut-free completeness for all logics
is provided both syntactically via a Maehara-style translation and semantically by constructing
an infinite birelational countermodel from a failed proof search. Interestingly, the Maehara-style
translation for proving soundness syntactically fails due to the hierarchical structure of nested
sequents. Consequently, we only provide the semantic proof of soundness. The countermodel
construction used to prove completeness required a completely novel approach to deal with two
independent sources of non-termination in the proof search present in the case of transitive and
Euclidean logics.
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* Embedded Computing Systems Group of the Institute of Computer Engineering and Theory and Logic Group
of the Institute of Computer Languages, Faculty of Informatics, TU Wien, Austria
Calcul des séquents emboités à la Maehara
Résumé : Nous dveloppons des calculs des séquents emboités à plusieurs conclusions pour les
quinze logiques du cube modal intuitionniste entre IK et IS5. La preuve de complétude sans coupure
pour toutes les logiques est fournie à la fois syntaxiquement via une traduction de style Maehara
et sémantiquement en construisant un contre-modèle birelational infini à partir d’une recherche
de preuve ratée. Il est intéressant de noter que la traduction de style Maehara pour prouver la
correction syntaxiquement échoue en raison de la structure hiérarchique des squences emboités. Par
conséquent, nous ne fournissons que la preuve sémantique de la correction.
Mots-clés : sequents embôıtés, logique modale intuitionniste
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1 Introduction
Ever since Gentzen’s LK and LI1, it is almost considered common knowledge that sequent systems
for intuitionistic logic are single conclusion, in other words, one must restrict the succedent to
(no more than) one formula. Gentzen [16] himself obtained this as a natural consequence of the
natural deduction presentation, which has only one conclusion. In effect, the ability to have several
formulas in the succedent was an additional feature introduced by Gentzen to incorporate the
principle of the excluded middle. Despite this near-consensus, a multi-conclusion sequent calculus
for intuitionistic propositional (and predicate) logic is almost as old as Gentzen’s LI. It was proposed
by Maehara [17] as the auxiliary calculus L1J used to translate intuitionistic reasoning into classical
one. It is hard to divine Maehara’s thinking: the terse language of results, the whole results, and
nothing but results was much in vogue at the time. But on the face of it, his system amounts to an
observation that most classical sequent rules remain valid intuitionistically, with only a couple of
propositional rules requiring the singleton-succedent restriction in the intuitionistic case. Thus, the
blanket restriction of succedent to (at most) singleton sets can be seen as an overreaction. Even the
interpretation of the succedent as the disjunction of its formulas is retained in Maehara’s calculus.
One possible criticism of this calculus could be that it was introduced as an auxiliary, artificial
construct bridging the gap between the natural(-deduction) inspired LI and the fully symmetric LK.
This criticism is, however, unfounded. It has been noted (see, for instance, the excellent in-depth
survey of various intuitionistic calculi by Dyckhoff [8]) that Maehara’s calculus is essentially a
notational variant of tableaux from Fitting’s PhD thesis [14] (which Fitting himself attributes to
Beth [3]). In fact, the same system can be found in [7] and, according to von Plato [25], a similar
system was considered by Gentzen himself.
In other words, this calculus is quite natural, has been discovered by several researchers
independently, and has a distinction of correlating with the semantic presentation of intuitionistic
reasoning much better than LI. Indeed, tableau rules are typically read from the semantics, and
Beth–Fitting’s destructive tableaux match intuitionistic Kripke models perfectly. It should also be
noted that Egly and Schmitt [9] demonstrated that LI cannot polynomially simulate Maehara’s
calculus, meaning that the latter is more efficient with respect to proof search.
The idea of extending intuitionistic reasoning with modalities is equally natural but less
straightforward. There have been multiple approaches over the years with each classical modal
logic receiving several alternative intuitionizations. We refer the reader to Simpson’s PhD [23] for
the discussion of these approaches and concentrate on what eventually became officially known
as intuitionistic modal logics. Just like for their classical counterparts, one can talk about the
intuitionistic modal cube consisting of 15 logics. And just like their classical brethren, ordinary
sequent systems seem inadequate to describe these logics, but nested sequent systems [5] exist for all
of them [24]. A nested sequent is a tree of ordinary sequents, referred to as sequent nodes. The tableau
analog of nested sequents is prefixed tableaux [13], the underlying idea being that the tree structure
of a sequent is homomorphically embedded into the accessibility structure of a Kripke model.
The nested sequent calculi in [24, 18, 6] for intuitionistic modal logics are all globally single-
conclusion: exactly one of the sequent nodes is allowed to have a non-empty succedent, and it
contains exactly one formula. One can say that they are the modalizations of LI in that the
propositional rules are local and identical to those in LI if the rest of the nested structure is ignored.
The goal of this paper is to construct a modalization of the Maehara-style calculus with propositional
rules conforming to the birelational semantics of intuitionistic modal logics. We formulate the
calculi for the 15 intuitionistic modal logics and prove their completeness in two alternative ways:
1. by a syntactic translation from the single-conclusion calculi of [24] and
2. by a direct semantic proof of cut admissibility.
The syntactic-translation method originally employed by Maehara in [17] for translating from
multi-conclusion systems to single-conclusion systems is not applicable in the setting of nested
1This calculus has been erroneously called LJ almost since the beginning. The mistake is due to the peculiarities
of the Sütterlin handwriting used by Gentzen. LI with ”I” standing for the German word intuitionistische the same
way as ”K” stands for the German word klassische in LK certainly makes much more sense than LJ (for more details,
see [25, p. 83]).
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d : A Ą 3A @w. Dv. wRv pserialq
t : pA Ą 3Aq ^ pA Ą Aq @w. wRw preflexiveq
b : pA Ą 3Aq ^ p3  A Ą Aq @w. @v. wRv Ą vRw psymmetricq
4 : p33A Ą 3Aq ^ pA Ą   Aq @w. @v. @u. wRv ^ vRu Ą wRu ptransitiveq
5 : p3A Ą 3Aq ^ p3  A Ą Aq @w. @v. @u. wRv ^ wRu Ą vRu pEuclideanq
Figure 1: Intuitionistic modal axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5 with corresponding frame conditions
sequents because formulas in the succedent of the sequent can occur in various places in the nested
sequent tree, and there is no immediate equivalence to their disjunction as it is the case with
ordinary sequents. Also the method by [9] that is based on rule permutations does not work in our
case, again, because the formulas in the succedent do not necessarily occur in the same sequent
node. For this reason, we prove soundness for our multi-conclusion systems by a direct semantic
argument.
This paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we recall the syntax and semantics
of intuitionistic modal logics, and in Section 3 we present our nested sequent systems, and we
show completeness of the multi-conclusion systems by using completeness of the single-conclusion
systems shown in [24]. Then we show semantically in Sections 4 the soundness of the multi-
conclusion systems, and finally, in Section 5, we give a semantic argument for the completeness of
the multi-conclusion system with respect to the birelational Kripke models.
2 Syntax and Semantics of Intuitionistic Modal Logics
Definition 2.1 (Language of intuitionistic modal logic). We start from a countable set A of
propositional variables (or atoms). Then the set M of formulas of intuitionistic modal logic (IML)
is generated by the grammar
M ::“ A | K | pM^Mq | pM_Mq | pMĄMq | M | 3M
We denote atoms by lowercase Latin letters, like a, b, c, and formulas by capital Latin letters,
like A, B, C. Negation can be defined as  A :“ AĄK, and the constant J is defined as J :“  K.
Definition 2.2 (Logic IK). A formula is a theorem of IK, an intuitionistic variant of the modal
logic K, if it can be derived from the axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) extended
with the k-axioms
k1 : pAĄBq Ą pAĄBq ,
k2 : pAĄBq Ą p3AĄ3Bq ,
k3 : 3pA_Bq Ą p3A_3Bq ,









mp ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
B
(2)
called necessitation and modus ponens respectively.
Note that in the classical case the axioms k2–k5 from (1) would follow from k1, but due to the
lack of De Morgan duality, this is not the case in intuitionistic logic.
This variant of IK has first been studied in [11, 21] and investigated in detail in [23]. There exist
other intuitionistic variants of K, e.g., [12, 22, 4, 20], the most prominent being the one which has
only the axioms k1 and k2 from (1). There is now consensus in the literature to call this variant
constructive modal logic, e.g., [1, 19, 2].
Besides the axioms (1) we also consider the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5 shown in the left column of
Figure 1. By adding a subset of these five axioms, we can a priori define 32 different logics. But
some of them coincide, so that we get (as in the classical case) only 15 different logics that can be
organized in the intuitionistic version of the “modal cube” [15], which is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The intuitionistic “modal cube”
Definition 2.3 (Logics IK ` X). For any X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u, the logic IK ` X is obtained from IK
by adding all axioms in X. We typically simplify the name of the logic by dropping the plus
and capitalizing the names of axioms that are letters. For example, the logic ID45 in Figure 2 is
IK`td, 4, 5u. Additionally, IS4 :“ IK`tt, 4u and IS5 :“ IK`tt, 4, 5u. We write IK`X $ A to state
that A is a theorem of IK` X.
Definition 2.4 (45-closure). A set X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u is called 45-closed if the following two conditions
are fulfilled:
1. if IK` X $ 4, then 4 P X;
2. if IK` X $ 5, then 5 P X.
The 45-closure of X, denoted by X̂, is the smallest 45-closed set that contains X.
Let us now recall the birelational models [21, 10] for intuitionistic modal logics, which are a com-
bination of the Kripke semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic and for classical modal logic.
Definition 2.5 (Birelational semantics). A frame xW,ď, Ry is a non-empty set W of worlds
together with two binary relations ď, R Ď W ˆ W , where ď is a preorder (i.e., reflexive and
transitive), such that the following two conditions hold:
(F1) For all w, v, v1, if wRv and v ď v1, then there is a w1 such that w ď w1 and w1Rv1.
(F2) For all w1, w, v, if w ď w1 and wRv, then there is a v1 such that w1Rv1 and v ď v1.
A (birelational) model M is a quadruple xW,ď, R, V y, where xW,ď, Ry is a frame, and V , called
the valuation, is a monotone function from the ď-ordered set xW,ďy of worlds into the set x2A,Ďy
of subsets of propositional variables ordered by inclusion. Valuation V maps each world w to the
set of propositional variables that are true in w. We write M, w , a if a P V pwq. The relation , is
extended to all formulas as follows:
 M, w . K;
 M, w , A^B iff M, w , A and M, w , B;
 M, w , A_B iff M, w , A or M, w , B;
 M, w , AĄB iff for all w1 ě w we have that M, w1 , A implies M, w1 , B;
 M, w , A iff for all w1, v1 PW with w1 ě w and w1Rv1 we have M, v1 , A;
 M, w , 3A iff there is a v PW such that wRv and M, v , A.
When M, w , A we say that w forces A in M. We write M, w . A (w does not force A in M) if
M, w , A does not hold. Whenever omit the name of the model M when it does not create confusion.
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In particular, note that w , J for all worlds w in all models. It is easy to show that:
Proposition 2.6 (Monotonicity). If w ď w1 and M, w , A, then M, w1 , A.
Definition 2.7 (Validity for formulas). We say that a formula A is valid in a model M and write
M , A if every world in M forces A.
Definition 2.8 (X-model and X-validity for formulas). Let X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u and M “ xW,ď, R, V y
be a birelational model. If the relation R obeys all frame conditions in the second column of
Figure 1 that correspond to the axioms in X, then we call M an X-model. We say that a formula A
is X-valid and write X , A if A is valid in every X-model.
The raison d’être of the birelational models is the following theorem, for which a proof can be
found in [23].
Theorem 2.9 (Soundness and completeness). For any X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u, a formula A is a theorem
of IK` X if and only if it is valid in all X-models, i.e.,
IK` X $ A ðñ X , A .
If we collapse the relation ď by letting w ď v iff w “ v we obtain the standard Kripke models
for classical modal logics.
3 Nested Sequents for Modal Logics
Ordinary one-sided sequents are usually multisets of formulas separated by commas:
A1, . . . , An . (3)
The intended meaning of such a sequent is given by its corresponding formula
A1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _An .
Ordinary two-sided sequents are pairs of such multisets of formulas usually separated by the sequent
arrow ñ. The corresponding formula of a two-sided sequent
B1, B2, . . . , Bh ñ C1, C2, . . . , Cl (4)
is the formula
B1 ^B2 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^Bh Ą C1 _ C2 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ Cl .
In their original formulation for classical modal logics, nested sequents are a generalization of
ordinary one-sided sequents: a nested sequent is a tree whose nodes are multisets of formulas. More
precisely, it is of the form
A1, . . . , An, rΓ1s, . . . , rΓms (5)
where A1, . . . , An are formulas and Γ1, . . . , Γm are nested sequents. The corresponding formula
for the sequent in (5) in the classical case is
A1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _An _fmpΓ1q _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _fmpΓmq
where fmpΓiq is the corresponding formula of Γi for i P t1, . . . ,mu. In the following, we just write
sequent for nested sequent.
Definition 3.1 (Sequent tree). For a sequent Γ we write trpΓq to denote its sequent tree whose
nodes (called sequent nodes from now on and denoted by lowercase Greek letters, like γ, δ, σ) are
multisets of formulas. We slightly abuse the notation and write γ P Γ instead of γ P trpΓq.
trpΓq :“
A1, . . . , Ak
trpΓ1q trpΓ2q ¨ ¨ ¨ trpΓnq
(6)
The depth of a sequent is defined to be the depth of its tree.
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For capturing intuitionistic logic, we need “two-sided” nested sequents. For this, we follow [24]
and assign each formula in the nested sequent a unique polarity that can be either ‚ for input/left
polarity (representing “being in the antecedent of the sequent” or “on the left of the sequent arrow,
if there were a sequent arrow”), and ˝ for output/right polarity (representing “being in the succedent
of the sequent” or “on the right of the sequent arrow, if there were a sequent arrow”).
Definition 3.2 (Two-sided nested sequent). A two-sided nested sequent is of the shape




1 . . . , C
˝
l , rΓ1s, . . . , rΓms (7)
where B1, . . . , Bh, C1, . . . , Cl are formulas and Γ1, . . . ,Γm are two-sided nested sequents.
In a classical setting, the corresponding formula of (7) is simply
B1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^Bh Ą C1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ Cl _fmpΓ1q _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _fmpΓmq . (8)
However, in the intuitionistic setting, the situation is not as simple. The systems presented
in [24, 18, 6] follow Gentzen’s idea of having exactly one formula of output polarity in the sequent.
Such a sequent is generated by the grammar
Definition 3.3 (Single-conclusion two-sided nested sequent).
Λ ::“ ∅ | Λ, B‚ | Λ, rΛs Γ ::“ Λ, C˝ | Λ, rΓs (9)
In (9), Λ stands for a sequent that contains only formulas with input polarity, and Γ for a sequent
that contains exactly one formula with output polarity. The corresponding formula of a sequent
in (9) is defined as follows:
fmp∅q :“ K ,
fmpΛ, B‚q :“ fmpΛq ^B ,
fmpΛ, rΛ1sq :“ fmpΛq ^3fmpΛ1q ,
fmpΛ, C˝q :“ fmpΛq Ą C ,
fmpΛ, rΓsq :“ fmpΛq ĄfmpΓq .
(10)
Unfortunately, it seems impossible to give such a corresponding formula for a multi-conclusion
sequent in the intuitionistic setting. For this reason, in the next section we provide an alternative
definition of validity for multi-conclusion sequents.
The next step is to show the inference rules. But before we can do so, we need to introduce an
additional notation.
Definition 3.4 (Sequent context). A (sequent) context is a nested sequent with a hole t u, taking
the place of a formula. Contexts are denoted by Γt u, and Γt∆u is the sequent obtained from Γt u
by replacing the occurrence of t u with ∆. We write ΓtHu for the sequent obtained from Γt u by
removing the t u (i.e., the hole is filled with nothing).
Definition 3.5 (Multi-conclusion nested sequent calculi NKK ` X for classical modal logics).
Figure 3 shows the system for the classical modal logic K, which is just the two-sided version of
Brünnler’s system [5] (see also [18]), extended with the rules for K and Ą.2 Then, Figure 4 shows
the rules for the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5 from Figure 1. For X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u we write X‚ and X˝ to
be the corresponding subsets of td‚, t‚, b‚, 4‚, 5‚u and td˝, t˝, b˝, 4˝, 5˝u respectively. Then we write
NKK` X :“ NKKY X‚ Y X˝ .
As usual, we denote derivability in these and other nested sequent calculi by using $.
Theorem 3.6 (Brünnler [5]). For a 45-closed set X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u, NKK`X is sound and complete
w.r.t. the classical modal logic K extended with the axioms X.
2We use here a system with explicit contraction and the additive versions for ^ and _ because in this way the
two intuitionistic systems we show later are just restrictions of the classical system.
RR n° 9123
































































































Figure 4: Rules for the axioms in Figure 1; 5˝ and 5‚ have proviso depthpΓt utHuq ě 1.
We can now straightforwardly obtain an intuitionistic variant of the system NKK by demanding
that each sequent occurring in a proof contains exactly one output formula. Note that almost all
rules in Figures 3 and 1 preserve this property when going from conclusion to premise, and can
therefore remain unchanged. There are only two rules that violate this condition: c˝ and Ą‚. We
therefore forbid the use of c˝ and change Ą‚ in that we delete the old output formula in the left
premise.
Definition 3.7 (Single-conclusion nested sequent calculi NIKs`X for intuitionistic modal logics).
NIKs :“ NKKztc˝,Ą‚u Y tĄ‚s u ,
where Ą‚s is the rule
ΓÓtA˝u ΓtB‚u
Ą‚s ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´ΓtAĄB‚u
(11)
with ΓÓt u standing for the context Γt u with all output formulas removed. For each X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u,
we define
NIKs` X :“ NIKsY X‚ Y X˝ .





We write NIKs` X1 for the system obtained from NIKs` X by replacing the two rules d‚ and d˝
with the rule drs if they are present:
NIKs` X1 :“
#
NIKs` Xztd‚, d˝u Y drs if d P X ,
NIKs` X otherwise.
(In a similar way we can define NKK` X1.)
Theorem 3.8 (Straßburger, [24]). For a 45-closed set X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u, NIKs` X1 is sound and
complete w.r.t. the intuitionistic modal logic IK` X.3
3In [24], the theorem is incorrectly stated for NIKs` X. However, in the absence of c˝, the rule drs is not admissible
in the general case (see Lemma 3.11 below).
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The proof in [24] is done via cut elimination where the cut rule is shown on the left below:
ΓÓtA˝u ΓtA‚u




cutm ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́
ΓtHu
. (12)
The variant of the cut rule on the right above is the version for the systems without the restriction
of having only one output formula in a sequent.
This brings us to the actual purpose of this paper: multiple-conclusion systems for the logics
IK` X, in the style of Maehara [17].
Definition 3.9 (Multi-conclusion nested sequent calculi NIKm`X and NIKm` X1 for intuitionistic
modal logics). As before, we start from the classical system and define
NIKm “ NKKztĄ˝,˝u Y tĄ˝m,
˝
mu
where the rules Ą˝m and ˝m are given below and ΓÓt u is defined in Definition 3.7:
ΓÓtA‚, B˝u
Ą˝m ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´ΓtAĄB˝u
,
ΓÓtrA˝su
˝m ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ΓtA˝u
. (13)
Then, the systems NIKm` X and NIKm` X1 are defined analogously to NIKs` X and NIKs` X1.
In all these systems, the weakening rule
ΓtHu
w ´́ ´́ ´́
Γt∆u
is depth-preserving admissible:
Lemma 3.10 (dp-admissibility of weakening). Let X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u. Then the weakening rule w
is depth-preserving admissible in NKK ` X, in NIKs ` X, and in NIKm ` X, i.e., if ΓtHu has a
proof, then Γt∆u has a proof of at most the same depth.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward induction on the depth of the derivation (see [5] for details).
The following lemma clarifies the relationship between the rule drs and the rules d‚ and d˝.
Lemma 3.11. Let X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u. If d P X then drs is admissible in NKK`X and in NIKm`X.
Furthermore, d‚ and d˝ are derivable in tdrs,‚,3˝u.
Proof. The proof of the first statement is by induction on the derivation depth with case distinction
based on the last rule used in this derivation. It is obvious that the empty bracket can be removed
from any initial sequent. For most rules, the statement for the conclusion easily follows from the IH
for the premises. If the bracket to be removed became empty because the last rule was ‚ with
∆ “ ∅, then these ‚ followed by drs can be replaced with d‚. This also proves the derivability
of d‚ from ‚ and drs. Similarly, 3˝ with ∆ “ ∅ followed by drs can be replaced with d˝, making
the latter derivable from 3˝ and drs. The cases for the rules 4˝, 4‚, 5˝, and 5‚ are similar. We only
show the transformation for 5˝:
Γt∅utr3A˝su
5˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́
Γt3A˝utr su




w ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
Γt∅utr3A˝, A˝su
5˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
Γt3A˝utrA˝su
d˝ ´́´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́
Γt3A˝ut3A˝u
5˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
Γt3A˝,3A˝ut∅u
c˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
Γt3A˝ut∅u
Note that the first transition is by weakening, which is admissible in all our systems by Lemma 3.10,
and that the proviso for both applications of 5˝ in the transformed derivation is satisfied whenever
it is satisfied in the original derivation.
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Remark 3.12. Lemma 3.11 fails to hold for NIKs` X because of the absence of c˝. Below is an
example of a derivation from which drs cannot be eliminated:
id ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
rra˝, a‚ss
3˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
r3a˝, ra‚ss
3˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
33a˝, rra‚ss
K‚ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
K‚, rra‚, b˝ss
Ą‚s ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́
33aĄK‚, rra‚, b˝ss
Ą˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
33aĄK‚, rraĄ b˝ss
d˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́
33aĄK‚, r3paĄ bq˝s
4˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́
33aĄK‚,3paĄ bq˝, r s
drs ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́
33aĄK‚,3paĄ bq˝
Ą˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́
p33aĄKq Ą3paĄ bq˝
In all systems presented so far, the identity rule id is restricted to atomic formulas, but the
general form is derivable.
Proposition 3.13 (Non-atomic initial sequents). For every formula A and every appropriate
context Γt u, the sequent
ΓtA‚, A˝u
is derivable in NKK, in NIKs, and in NIKm.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on A.
Remark 3.14. The appropriateness of the context only plays a role for NIKs, where Γt u is not
allowed to contain output formulas.
Maehara shows [17] the equivalence of his multiple conclusion system to Gentzen’s single
conclusion system from [16] by translating a multiple conclusion sequent into a single conclusion
sequent whereby the multiple formulas on the right are replaced by one, their disjunction. This
is not possible in the nested sequent setting because “the formulas on the right” are generally
scattered all over the sequent tree.
However, one direction is straightforward:
Theorem 3.15 (Translation from single- to multi-conclusion). Let X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u and Γ be a
single-conclusion sequent.
NIKs` X $ Γ ùñ NIKm` X $ Γ ,
NIKs` X1 $ Γ ùñ NIKm` X1 $ Γ .
Proof. The only rule in NIKs` X (resp. NIKs` X1) that is not an instance of a rule in NIKm` X
(resp. NIKm` X1) is Ą‚s . But it can be derived using Ą
‚ and weakening. Thus, the theorem follows
from Lemma 3.10.
Corollary 3.16. Let X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u. If a sequent Γ is provable in NIKs` X or in NIKs` X1,
then Γ is also provable both in NIKm` X and in NIKm` X1.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 3.15 using Lemma 3.11.
Note that in Corollary 3.16, it is implicitly assumed that the sequent Γ has exactly one output
formula because otherwise it could not be the endsequent of a correct derivation in NIKs` X or
NIKs` X1.
Corollary 3.17 (Formula-level completeness of NIKm` X and NIKm` X1). For a 45-closed set
X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u,
X , B ùñ NIKm` X $ B˝ ,
X , B ùñ NIKm` X1 $ B˝ .
Proof. If B is X-valid, then B˝ is derivable in NIKs` X1 by Theorem 3.8. Thus, B˝ is derivable
both in NIKm` X and in NIKm` X1 by Corollary 3.16.
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4 Semantic Proof of Soundness
In this section we show that every rule in NIKm` X is sound with respect to X-models. For this,
we first have to extend the notion of validity from formulas to sequents.
Definition 4.1 (M-map). For a sequent Γ and a birelational model M “ xW,ď, R, V y, an M-map
for Γ is a map f : trpΓq Ñ W from nodes of the sequent tree to worlds in the model such that,
whenever δ is a child of γ in trpΓq, then fpγqRfpδq.
Definition 4.2 (Forcing for sequents). A sequent Γ is satisfied by an M-map f for Γ, written
f , Γ, iff
M, fpγq , A for all A‚ P γ P Γ ùñ M, fpδq , B for some B˝ P δ P Γ .
If Γ is not satisfied by f , it is refuted by it.
Remark 4.3. This definition works for both single- and multi-conclusion sequents.
Definition 4.4 (X-validity for sequents). For every X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u, a sequent Γ is X-valid, written
X , Γ, iff it is satisfied by all M-maps for Γ for all X-models M. A sequent is X-refutable iff there
is an M-map for an X-model M that refutes it.
Lemma 4.5 (Sequent validity extends formula validity). A formula B is X-valid in all X-models
if and only if the sequent B˝ is:
X , B ðñ X , B˝ .
Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of validity.
Theorem 4.6 (Soundness). For any X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u,
NIKm` X $ Σ ùñ X , Σ .
Proof. We prove the contrapositive: if Σ is X-refutable, then NIKm ` X does not prove Σ. To
demonstrate this, it is sufficient to show that, whenever the conclusion of a rule from NIKm` X is
X-refutable, then so is at least one of the premises of this rule.
Let M “ xW,ď, R, V y be an arbitrary X-model and f be an arbitrary M-map for the conclusion Γ
of a given rule. Let γ P Γ be the node with the hole of this rule. Since the model M is never
modified, we omit its mentions in this proof. Note that an M-map refutes a sequent iff it maps its
nodes into worlds of M in a way that makes all input formulas forced and all output formulas not
forced.
Initial sequents. The statement is vacuously true for K‚ and id because neither ΓtK‚u nor
Γta‚, a˝u can be refuted in any birelational model.
Local propositional rules _‚, ^‚, Ą‚, _˝, ^˝. Since propositional rules (including contraction
rules) are local in that they act within one node of the sequent tree, the node we called γ, the proof
for them is analogous to the case of propositional intuitionistic logic. Namely, for all propositional
rules except Ą˝m, for any birelational model M, any M-map refuting the conclusion must refute one
of the premises. Consider, for instance, an instance of the rule _‚ and an M-map f that refutes its
conclusion ΓtA_B‚u. In particular, it forces all input formulas from Γt u, forces none of output
formulas from Γt u (each formula at the world assigned by f), and satisfies fpγq , A_B. For the
latter to happen, either fpγq , A, making f refute the left premise ΓtA‚u, or fpγq , B, in which
case it is the right premise ΓtB‚u that is refuted by f .
Rule Ą˝m. Assume that all input formulas in the conclusion of the rule
ΓÓtB‚, C˝u
Ą˝m ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´ΓtB Ą C˝u
are forced and all output formulas are not forced by an M-map f in their respective worlds, in
particular, fpγq . B Ą C. Then there exists a world w ě fpγq where w , B and w . C. It is
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easy to show using (F1) and (F2) that there exists another M-map g for the conclusion such that
gpγq “ w and gpδq ě fpδq for each node δ P ΓtB Ą C˝u. By monotonicity (Proposition 2.6), all
input formulas in the conclusion are also forced by g in their respective worlds. Since additionally
gpγq , B and gpγq . C, it follows that in the premise all input formulas are forced and the only
output formula, C, is not forced by g in their respective worlds. Thus, the constructed g refutes
the premise in the same model.
Rules ‚, 3˝, t‚, t˝, b‚, b˝, 4˝, and 5˝. Although these rules are not local in that they affect
two nodes of the sequent tree, their treatment is much the same as that of propositional rules: any
M-map refuting the conclusion must also refute the premise. Consider, for instance,
Γtr3A˝,∆su
4˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
Γt3A˝, r∆su
.
Assume that all input formulas in the conclusion are forced and all output formulas are not forced
by an M-map f in their respective worlds of a transitive model M, in particular, fpγq . 3A. Let
δ be the node corresponding to the displayed bracket. Note that fpγqRfpδq. Consider any world
w such that fpδqRw. Then, by transitivity, fpγqRw and w . A. We have shown that w . A
whenever fpδqRw. Thus, fpδq . 3A, which is sufficient to demonstrate that f refutes the premise
of the rule. We also show the argument for
ΓtHut3A˝u
5˝ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
Γt3A˝utHu
.
Assume that all input formulas in the conclusion are forced and all output formulas are not forced
by an M-map f in their respective worlds of a Euclidean model M, in particular, fpγq . 3A for the
displayed 3A in the conclusion (here γ is node with the hole containing the principle formula). Let
δ be the nodes containing the other hole and ρ be the root of the sequent tree. Then fpρqRkfpγq
and fpρqRlfpδq for some k, l ě 0. Moreover, the proviso for the rule demands that k ą 0. Consider
any world w such that fpδqRw. Then both fpγq and w are accessible from fpρq in one or more
R steps. It is an easy corollary of Euclideanity that fpγqRw, meaning that w . A. We have shown
that w . A whenever fpδqRw. Thus, fpδq . 3A, which is sufficient to demonstrate that f refutes
the premise of the rule.
Rules 4‚ and 5‚ are similar in nature but require an additional consideration in the proof. We
explain it on the example of
ΓtrA‚,∆su
4‚ ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´
ΓtA‚, r∆su
.
As in the case of 4˝, we deal with two nodes: parent γ and its child δ, the latter corresponding
to the displayed bracket. We assume that fpγq , A and need to show that fpδq , A. The
difference lies in the fact that apart from worlds accessible from fpδq itself, as in the case of 4˝,
we have to consider also worlds accessible from futures of fpδq. However, the condition (F1) and
transitivity ensure that any world accessible from a future of fpδq is also accessible from some
future of fpγq making it possible to apply the assumption.
Rules 3‚, d‚, and d˝. All these rules are similar to the majority of modal rules, except for the
fact that one needs to choose a new world for the premise. For rules d‚ and d˝, this world is chosen
as any world accessible from fpγq by seriality. For the rule 3‚, the assumption is that 3A is forced
at fpγq, which implies that there exists an accessible world forcing A, and it is this world that
is chosen for the extra node in the sequent tree of the premise. Consider, e.g., an instance of 3‚
and assume that f refutes its conclusion Γt3A‚u. In particular, fpγq , 3A. Thus, there exists a
world w PW such that fpγqRw and w , A. We define an M-map g for the premise ΓtrA‚su to act
like f on all nodes that are present in the conclusion and to map the node δ corresponding to the
displayed bracket to w. Then, just like f , the map g forces all input formula in Γt u and none of
output formulas in Γt u and, in addition, gpδq , A, meaning that g refutes the premise.
Rule ˝m. Assume that all input formulas in the conclusion of the rule
ΓÓtrA˝su
˝m ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ΓtA˝u
.
Inria
Maehara-style Modal Nested Calculi 13
are forced and all output formulas are not forced by an M-map f in their respective worlds, in
particular, fpγq . A. Then there exist worlds u and w such that u ě fpγq, and uRw, and w . A.
It is easy to show using (F1) and (F2) that there exists an M-map g for the premise such that
gpγq “ u, gpδq “ w for the node δ present in the premise but not in the conclusion, and gpϑq ě fpϑq
for each node ϑ P ΓtA˝u. By monotonicity (Proposition 2.6), all input formulas in the conclusion
are also forced by g in their respective worlds. Since additionally gpδq . A, it follows that in the
premise all input formulas are forced and the only output formula, A, is not forced by g in their
respective worlds. Thus, the constructed g refutes the premise in the same model.
This completes the proof of soundness.
5 Semantic Proof of Completeness
In this section we show the completeness of our multiple conclusion systems semantically. To
simplify the argument, we work with a modified system cNIKm` X1, that is defined as follows.
For every inference rule in NIKm` X (and NIKm` X1), except for Ą˝m and ˝m, we can define its
contraction variant, denoted by the subscript c, that keeps the principal formula of the conclusion
in all premises. Below are three examples:
ΓtA‚, rA‚,∆su
‚c ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ΓtA‚, r∆su
,
Γt3A‚, rA‚su
3‚c ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́Γt3A‚u
,
ΓtAĄB‚, A˝u ΓtAĄB‚, B‚u
Ą‚c ´́´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́ ´́´ΓtAĄB‚u
.
Note that K‚ and K‚c are identical (as are d
rs and d
rs
c ). We denote by cNIKm` X1 the system
obtained from NIKm` X1 by removing c‚ and c˝, and by replacing every rule, except for Ą˝m and ˝m,
with its contraction variant.
Definition 5.1 (Equivalent derivations). Two derivations are equivalent if they have the same
endsequent. Two systems S1 and S2 are equivalent if for every derivation in S1, there is a derivation
in S2 of the same endsequent, and vice versa.
Lemma 5.2 (Equivalence of Kleene’ing). For every X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u, the systems
NIKm` X, NIKm` X1, and cNIKm` X1
are pairwise equivalent.
Proof. Every rule rc is derivable via r and c
‚ or c˝, and conversely, every rule r is derivable
from rc and w. Hence, the statement follows from Lemmas 3.10 and 3.11.
We can now state the completeness theorem:
Theorem 5.3 (Completeness). Let X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u be a 45-closed set, and let Υ be a sequent.
X , Υ ùñ NIKm` X $ Υ .
Remark 5.4. Note that this is stronger than the completeness result proved syntactically in
Corollary 3.17 which was formulated for single formulas rather than arbitrary sequents. While the
argument used to prove Corollary 3.17 extends as is to single-conclusion sequents, the result in this
section shows completeness for all multi-conclusion sequents.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 5.3, and we let X and Υ be fixed.
We prove the contrapositive: if NIKm` X & Υ, then Υ is X-refutable. By Lemma 5.2 we can work
with the system cNIKm` X1, which is equivalent to NIKm`X. We work with the (almost) complete
proof search tree T in cNIKm` X1 that is constructed as follows: the nodes of T are sequents, and
the root of T is the endsequent Υ. For each possible unary rule application r to a sequent Γ in T the
premise of r is a child of Γ in T, and for each possible binary rule application to Γ, both premises
of r are children of Γ in T. (Recall that we mean here upward rule applications.) There are only
two exceptions: along each branch of the proof search tree
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1. each formula 3A‚ is used no more than once as the principal formula of the rule 3‚c (different
occurrences of the same formula in the same sequent node are considered the “same” here)
and
2. each sequent node is used no more than once as the principal node of the rule drs (but, of
course, the rule drs is applied to every node in a sequent Γ).
The countermodel that we are going to construct will be based on the tree T that is obtained
from T by removing all subtrees that have derivable sequents as roots. In the following, we use
Γ,∆, etc. to denote sequent occurrences in T rather than sequents.
We distinguish three types of unary rules:
1. the leveling rules Ą˝m and ˝m, which are non-invertible,
2. the node creating rules 3‚c and d
rs, and
3. all other unary rules (which are invertible), that we call simple.
Definition 5.5 (Level). The level of Γ (and of every γ P Γ) is the total number of leveling-rule
instances on the path from Υ to Γ in T. Sequents Γ and ∆ with the same level are equilevel.
In contrast to the soundness proof, we now distinguish between nodes in the premise and
conclusion of the rule, which necessitates the following
Definition 5.6 (Corresponding nodes). Let Ω be the set of all sequent nodes of all sequent
occurrences in T. We define the correspondence relation « on Ω recursively:
 if γ and δ can be traced to the same sequent node in the endsequent Υ, then γ « δ;
 if γ and δ are created by instances of 3‚c with the same principal formula 3A
‚ in nodes γ1 « δ1
respectively, then γ « δ;
 if γ and δ are created by instances of drs from nodes γ1 « δ1 respectively, then γ « δ;
 if γ and δ are created by applications of ˝m with the same principal formula A˝ in equilevel
nodes γ1 « δ1 respectively, then γ « δ.
If γ « δ, we also say that γ and δ are corresponding.
Clearly, « is an equivalence relation. It is easy to see that distinct nodes of the same sequent
occurrence cannot be corresponding. For a sequent node γ P Ω and a sequent occurrence ∆ we
denote by γ∆ the unique sequent node of ∆ corresponding to γ (if it exists). If γ is the parent of δ in
trpΓq and both γΣ and δΣ exist for some sequent occurrence Σ, then γΣ is the parent of δΣ in trpΣq.
Definition 5.7 (Superior sequent). We call ∆ a superior of Γ, written Γ Ď ∆, if γ∆ exists for all
γ P Γ and satisfies γ Ď γ∆ as multisets of formulas.
It is clear that Ď is reflexive and transitive.
Definition 5.8 (Corresponding rules). Two instances of the same rule r are called corresponding
if they are applied to nodes γ « δ, to the same principal formula in γ and δ (this requirement is
dropped for drs, which has no principal formulas), to corresponding children of γ and δ (for ‚c , 3˝c ,
4‚c , and 4
˝





Clearly, rule correspondence is also an equivalence relation.
Definition 5.9 (Rule transfer). Let r be a rule instance and ∆ be the conclusion of a corresponding
rule instance. We denote the first premise of this corresponding rule instance by rp∆q and, in case
of binary rules, the second premise by r1p∆q.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the definition:
Lemma 5.10 (Corresponding rules for superior sequents). Let Γ be the conclusion of a rule
instance r and ∆ be a superior of Γ.
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 If r is not node-creating, then ∆ is the conclusion of a corresponding rule instance and
rpΓq Ď rp∆q (also r1pΓq Ď r1p∆q for binary rules).
 If r is node-creating, then either
1. a corresponding rule instance has already been used on the path from Υ to ∆ and
rpΓq Ď ∆, or
2. ∆ is the conclusion of a corresponding rule instance and rpΓq Ď rp∆q.
In the former case, we define rp∆q :“ ∆ to unify the notation.
In the following, we use G to denote an arbitrary subset of the set of sequent occurrences in T.
We write G Ď T if all occurrences are taken from T.
Definition 5.11 (Confluent sets). A set G Ď T is called confluent iff the following condition is
satisfied: for any Γ,∆ P G, the sequent occurrences Γ and ∆ are equilevel and there is a sequent
occurrence Σ P G that is a superior of both Γ and ∆. The set G is maximal confluent if it is
confluent and has no proper confluent supersets in T.
It is an immediate corollary of Zorn’s Lemma that
Lemma 5.12 (“Lindenbaum”). Each confluent set can be extended to a maximal confluent set.
Definition 5.13. Let G Ď T be a set of sequent occurrences, and let r be a rule instance with
conclusion in G. Then we define
rpGq :“ trp∆q | ∆ P G and rp∆q is definedu .
For binary rules, we use r1pGq for the second premises.
Lemma 5.14 (Properties of confluent sets). Let the set G Ď T be confluent, and let r be a rule
instance with conclusion in G.
1. If r is unary, then rpGq is confluent, and rpGq Ď T. If r is not a leveling rule, then GY rpGq
is also confluent, and GY rpGq Ď T.
2. If r is simple and G is maximal confluent, then rpGq Ď G, in other words, maximal confluent
sets are closed with respect to applications of simple rules.
3. If r is a binary rule, then at least one of rpGq and r1pGq is a confluent set and contained
in T, and additionally must be a subset of G if the latter is maximal confluent.
Proof. 1. Let rpΠq, rp∆q P rpGq, where Π,∆ P G. By the confluence of G, there is Σ P G such
that Π,∆ Ď Σ. By Lemma 5.10,
rpΠq, rp∆q Ď rpΣq P rpGq . (14)
This demonstrates that rpGq is confluent.
For a non-leveling r, take two sequents from GY rpGq. If both belong to G or both belong
to rpGq, the two sequents have a superior in the same set by its confluence. If Π P G and
rp∆q P rpGq, then there is a superior Σ Ě Π,∆ in G by its confluence. By Lemma 5.10,
(14) holds again. Given that rpΠq Ě Π because r is not a leveling rule, rpΣq P rpGq is a superior
of both Π and rp∆q.
2. Follows from Clause 1 and the maximality of G.
3. We prove that either rpGq Ď T or r1pGq Ď T by contradiction. Otherwise, there would have
been Π,∆ P G such that rTpΠq and r
1
Tp∆q are both derivable. For a superior Σ Ě Π,∆, which
would have existed by the confluence of G, both rpΣq and r1pΣq would have been derivable by
admissibility of weakening (Lemma 3.10), making Σ P G Ď T derivable by r, in contradiction
to our assumptions. Whichever of rpGq or r1pGq is within T must be confluent (and contained
in G for maximal confluent sets) as in Clause 1.
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Definition 5.15 (Limit). For a confluent set G we define its limit Ĝ as a (possibly infinite) nested
sequent tree obtained by taking the quotient of all sequent nodes in G with respect to the equivalence
relation «, i.e., trpĜq consists of equivalence classes rγsG over all γ P Γ P G. We define rγsG to be
the parent of rδsG in trpĜq iff there are γ
1 P rγsG and δ
1 P rδsG such that γ
1 is the parent of δ1 in





Lemma 5.16. Ĝ is well-defined, i.e., trpĜq is a tree. Furthermore, if ρ is the root of Γ P G, then
rρsG is the root of trpĜq.
Proof. It immediately follows from Definition 5.6 that ρ1 « ρ2 for the roots ρ1 and ρ2 of any two
sequents Σ1,Σ2 P G because ρ1 and ρ2 can be traced down to the root ρΥ of the endsequent Υ.
Thus, rρsG includes all roots of all sequents in G. To show that there is a path from rρsG to any
element rγsG P Ĝ for a node γ from Σ P G, it remains to note that there is a path from ρΣ to γ in
trpΣq and that ρΣ « ρ.
Further, it is easy to show that for γ « δ with γ from a sequent Σ P G and δ from a sequent
Π P G, the path from ρΣ to γ has the same length as the path from ρΠ to δ. In other words,
each edge in trpĜq increases the distance from the root (in each member sequent), which prevents
directed cycles.
Finally, we show that each node in trpĜq has at most one parent. Indeed, assume rγsG and
rγ1sG are both parents of rδsG in trpĜq. This means that γΣ is the parent of δΣ and γ
1
Π is the
parent of δΠ for some sequent occurrences Σ and Π from the confluent set G. They must have a




Λ exist by superiority
of Λ and since both γΛ and γ
1
Λ must coincide with the unique parent of δΛ in trpΛq, it follows that
γΛ “ γ
1
Λ and, consequently, γΣ « γ
1
Π. In other words, rγsG “ rγ
1sG.
Definition 5.17 (Countermodel). We define M :“ xW,ď, R, V y, where
 W :“ trγsG P Ĝ | γ P Γ P G and G is maximal confluent and G Ď Tu.
 The binary relation R0 on W is the (disjoint) union of all parent–child relations on Ĝ over all
maximal confluent sets G Ď T. The binary relation R on W is defined as the closure of R0
with respect to the frame properties corresponding to the axioms from the 45-closed X, except
for seriality.
 For rγsG, rδsH P W , where G and H are maximal confluent sets of sequents, we define
rγsG ď0 rδsH iff for some conclusion Γ P G and premise ∆ P H of a leveling-rule instance r
with rpGq Ď H we have γΓ « δ∆. The binary relation ď on W is the reflexive and transitive
closure of ď0.
 For rγsG PW , we define V prγsGq :“ ta | a
‚ P rγsGu.
Note that this model construction is a distant relative of the canonical models. Indeed, the
structure of the proof-search tree is almost completely ignored: only levels are used to prevent
maximal confluent sets from reaching over leveling rules. We use the completeness of the (infinite)
proof search to demonstrate the properties of maximal confluent trees, there is no direct translation
of rule applications in the proof search to accessibility relation in the model.
Lemma 5.18 (Input formula preservation). If A‚ P rγsG and rγsG ď rδsH, then A
‚ P rδsH.
Proof. The statement for ď follows from that for ď0. Assume A
‚ P rγsG and rγsG ď0 rδsH. Then
1. A‚ P γΠ for some Π P G and
2. for some conclusion Γ P G and premise ∆ P H of a leveling-rule instance r with rpGq Ď H we
have γΓ « δ∆.
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By confluence of G, there is a superior Σ to both Π and Γ. We have A‚ P γΠ Ď γΣ and
rpΣq P rpGq Ď H. Thus, A‚ P γrpΣq. Since
γrpΣq « γΓ « δ∆ « δ ,
it follows that γrpΣq P rδsH and A
‚ P rδsH.
Lemma 5.19 (Correctness). M is an X-model.
Proof. Clearly, W ‰ ∅. By construction, R satisfies all requisite frame conditions other than
seriality, and ď is a preorder.
Seriality. If seriality is explicitly required, then drs is a rule of cNIKm` X1. By Lemma 5.14, for
every rγsG PW , where γ P Γ P G, we have that rpΓq P G for the instance r of d
rs applied to γ. Since
γrpΓq must have a child δ in trprpΓqq, we have rγsGRrδsG.
Monotonicity. To show monotonicity of V along ď, assume a P V prγsGq and rγsG ď rδsH. Then
a‚ P rγsG and a
‚ P rδsH by Lemma 5.18. Hence, a P V prδsHq.
(F1)–(F2). Since the proofs of these two properties are similar, we only show (F2). We first
show (F2) for ď0 and R0. Assume that
rγsG ď0 rδsH and rγsGR0rσsG
for some rγsG, rσsG, rδsH PW . This means that:
1. for some conclusion Γ P G and premise ∆ P H of a leveling-rule instance r with rpGq Ď H we
have γΓ « δ∆ and
2. for some Π P G, the node γΠ is the parent of σΠ in trpΠq.
By confluence of G, there is a superior Σ to both Π and Γ. In trpΣq, the node γΣ is the parent
of σΣ. Further rpΣq P rpGq Ď H and γrpΣq is the parent of σrpΣq in trprpΣqq. Since σrpΣq « σΣ « σ,
rσsG ď0 rσrpΣqsH .
Since γrpΣq « γΓ « δ∆ « δ, it follows that
rδsHR0rσrpΣqsH .
Extending (F2) to ď and R0 is straightforward.
It remains to note that, if (F1)–(F2) hold for ď and R0, then they hold for ď and R, which is
the closure of R0 with respect to the frame properties of X. This is proved by induction on the
length of derivation of an R-link from the R0-links. (Recall that no seriality closure is performed.)
We show only (F1) for the Euclidean closure: assuming by IH that the R-links
rγsGRrδsG and rγsGRrσsG
satisfy both (F1)–(F2), we show that
rδsGRrσsG
satisfies (F1). Let rδsG ď rδ
1sH. By (F1) for rγsGRrδsG, there is rγ
1sH such that
rγ1sHRrδ
1sH and rγsG ď rγ
1sH .
By (F2) for rγsGRrσsG, there is rσ
1sH such that
rγ1sHRrσ
1sH and rσsG ď rσ
1sH .
Finally, we have rδ1sHRrσ
1sH by Euclideanity. The cases for transitivity, reflexivity, and symmetry
are similar.
Lemma 5.20 (Modal saturation). Assume that rγsGRrδsG in the constructed model M.
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1. If A‚ P rγsG, then A‚ P rδsG. In addition, if R was obtained by applying (among others)
transitive closure to R0, then A‚ P rδsG.
2. If 3A˝ P rγsG, then A
˝ P rδsG. In addition, if R was obtained by applying (among others)
transitive closure to R0, then 3A
˝ P rδsG. (transitive case)
Both additional statements also hold when the closure included Euclideanity and rγsG is not the
root of Ĝ. (Euclidean case)
Proof. The last claim is a direct consequence of the closure of G w.r.t. 5‚c and 5
˝
c . The other claims
are proved by induction on the length of a minimal derivation of an R-link from the R0-links. For
the remaining statements, consider A‚ because 3A˝ is completely analogous.
R0-links. For R0-links, A
‚ P rδsG follows from the closure of maximal confluent sets w.r.t. ‚c . For
transitive logics, additionally A‚ P rδsG because of 4‚c .
Reflexive closure. If the link rγsGRrγsG is obtained by reflexivity, then A‚ P rγsG trivially and
A‚ P rγsG because of t
‚
c .
Symmetric closure. If the link rγsGRrδsG is obtained by symmetry from rδsGRrγsG, then by
minimality it is neither an R0-link nor a reflexive loop.
 In the absence of transitivity closure, rδsGR0rγsG by minimality: if rδsGRrγsG were added
by Euclideanity from rσsGRrδsG and rσsGRrγsG, then adding rγsGRrδsG instead would have
been shorter. Thus, A‚ P rδsG because of b
‚
c .
 In the transitive case, 5 P X by 45-closure. If neither rγsG nor rδsG is the root of Ĝ, then
A‚ is in rδsG and its parent by 5‚c and A‚ P rδsG by ‚c . If rγsG is the root, both A‚ and A‚
belong to all nodes of Ĝ by ‚c , 4‚c , and b‚c (for A‚ P rγsG). If rδsG but not rγsG is the root,
then A‚ is in rδsG and all its children, which exist, by 5‚c and A‚ is in rδsG by b‚c .
Transitive closure. If the link rγsGRrδsG is obtained by transitivity from rγsGRrσsG and rσsGRrδsG,
then both of them have shorter derivations and, by IH, A‚,A‚ P rσsG. Hence, by IH, both
A‚,A‚ P rδsG.
Euclidean closure. Assume the link rγsGRrδsG is obtained by Euclideanity from rσsGRrγsG and
rσsGRrδsG. It is sufficient to show that A‚ is present in all nodes of Ĝ, including rσsG and rδsG,
from which the main statement follows by IH from rσsGRrδsG:
 If rγsG is not the root of Ĝ, then A‚ is in all nodes by 5‚c .
 If rγsG is the root, then we claim that transitivity must also hold. Otherwise, by 45-closure
of X, none of reflexive, symmetric or transitive closure would apply to R and Euclidean closure
alone would not have added any incoming links into the root rγsG. This means that transitive
closure has also been applied. Therefore, from A‚ P rγsG it immediately follows by 4‚c that
A‚ is present in all nodes.
Lemma 5.21 (Truth Lemma). If C‚ P rγsG, then rγsG ( C; if C
˝ P rγsG, then rγsG * C.
Proof. The proof is reasonably standard and relies on Lemma 5.20 for input ’s and output 3’s,
as well as on Lemma 5.18 for input Ą’s and ’s. The cases for C‚ “ a‚, C‚ “ K‚, and C˝ “ K˝
are trivial.
Case C˝ “ a˝. If a˝ P rγsG, then a
‚ R rγsG. Indeed, if a
‚ P γΠ and a
˝ P γ∆ for some Π,∆ P G, then
any superior Σ of Π and ∆, would be derivable due to both a‚, a˝ P γΣ, whereas the confluent G
must contain a non-derivable superior of Π and ∆.
Case C‚ “ A^ B‚. If A^ B‚ P rγsG, then both A
‚, B‚ P rγsG by Lemma 5.14. Thus, rγsG ( A
and rγsG ( B by IH, making rγsG ( A^B.
Case C˝ “ A_B˝ is similar.
Case C˝ “ A^ B˝. If A^ B˝ P rγsG, then either A
˝ P rγsG or B
˝ P rγsG by Lemma 5.14. Thus,
either rγsG * A or rγsG * B by IH, making rγsG * A^B.
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Case C‚ “ A_B‚ is similar.
Case C˝ “ A Ą B˝. If A Ą B˝ P rγsG, then there is a maximal confluent set H Ě rpGq with
rγrpΓqsH ě0 rγsG for the application r of Ą
˝ to A Ą B˝ in some γΓ for some Γ P G. In that case,
A‚, B˝ P rγrpΓqsH. Thus, by IH rγrpΓqsH ( A and rγrpΓqsH * B making rγsG * AĄB.
Case C‚ “ A Ą B‚. Let A Ą B‚ P rγsG and rδsH ě rγsG. By monotonicity of input formulas
(Lemma 5.18), A Ą B‚ P rδsH. By Lemma 5.14, either A
˝ P rδsH or B
‚ P rδsH. Thus, for any
rδsH ě rγsG, we have by IH that either rδsH * A or rδsH ( B. Thus, rγsG ( AĄB.
Case C‚ “ 3A‚. If 3A‚ P rγsG, then by Lemma 5.14, there is another sequent ∆ P G with A
‚ P δ
for the child δ of γ∆ in trp∆q. Thus, rδsG ( A by IH. Since rγsGR0rδsG, we have rγsG ( 3A.
Case C˝ “ 3A˝. Let 3A˝ P rγsG and rγsGRrδsG. Then, by Lemma 5.20, we have A
˝ P rδsG. Thus,
by IH rδsG * A whenever rγsGRrδsG. We have shown that rγsG * 3A.
Case C˝ “ A˝. If A˝ P rγsG, then there is a maximal confluent set H Ě rpGq with rγrpΓqsH ě rγsG
for the application r of ˝ to A˝ in some γΓ for some Γ P G. In that case, A˝ P rδsH for the child δ
of γrpΓq in trprpΓqq. Thus, by IH rδsH * A. Since rγsG ď0 rγrpΓqsHR0rδsH, we have rγsG * A.
Case C‚ “ A‚ combines the monotonicity argument for input implications with the use of
Lemma 5.20 for output diamonds.
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. By Lemma 5.12, the endsequent Υ belongs to some maximal confluent set G.
The map f : γ ÞÑ rγsG embeds trpΥq into M. By the Truth Lemma 5.21, this map refutes the
endsequent.
Corollary 5.22 (Cut admissibility). For a 45-closed X Ď td, t, b, 4, 5u, the rule cutm is admissible
in NIKm` X.
Proof. If NIKm` X` cutm $ Γ, then Γ is X-valid by Soundness Theorem 4.6 and the obvious fact
that cutm preserves validity. Thus, NIKm` X $ Γ by Completeness Theorem 5.3.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a multiple-conclusion calculus for all intuitionistic modal logics in
the intuitionistic S5-cube, using nested sequents. The observation made by Egly and Schmitt [9],
that multiple conclusion calculi for intuitionistic logic can provide exponentially shorter proofs
than single-conclusion calculi, does also apply to our case, which makes our calculi interesting for
possible applications in proof search.
This raises the question whether we can obtain a focused variant for the multiple-conclusion
calculus, in the same way as for the single-conclusion calculus in [6]. The answer is not as easy
as one might expect: due to the non-invertibility of the rules Ą˝m and ˝m, we have to make the
connectives Ą and  positive. But in a focused system also 3 has to be positive. On the one
hand, due to the absence of De Morgan duality, we certainly can make both modalities positive.
But on the other hand, this is against the “spirit of focusing” which demands to make as much as
possible negative—the more connectives are negative, the less choices we have to make and the less
backtracking is needed. Having a “focused system” in which every connective is positive is trivial
and not interesting.
However, there is something more to say about 3. It can be seen as “morally negative” because
when the 3˝ and X˝-rules are applicable, they can be applied such that no backtracking is needed
(using contraction and the multiple conclusion setting). But this is not “negative” in the sense of
focusing: we cannot dispose of 3 after the rule application because we might have to wait for an
instance of  to unfold first. This is a topic of ongoing research.
It remains an open problem whether the multi-conclusion calculi have a formula interpretation.
It would also be useful to remove the condition of 45-closure from the completeness proves, in
the style of [18].
The semantic proof of completeness required a novel method of model construction. However,
both the original proof-search tree and the constructed model are generally infinite. It is an
interesting task to attempt to finitize the construction.
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